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HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF PHYSICIANS:
SOME NEEDED LEGAL SUTURES
Traditionally, hospitals were shielded from tort liability by either
charitable or governmental immunity.' Judicial antipathy to these doctrines
during the last few decades, 2 however, has made hospitals more susceptible
to suit. Moreover, widespread changes in characteristics, functions, and activities have caused hospitals to assume an increasingly important role in
supplying and regulating patients' medical care. The combination of expanded tort liability and role alteration has caused hospital liability to be4
come a dynamic area of the law.
In no aspect of this field has its relativity been more apparent than in
the physician-institution relationship. This commentary analyzes the various
legal theories under which hospitals can be held liable for the negligence of
both salaried and nonsalaried physicians.
THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Respondeat Superior -

Traditional

Respondeat superior is a form of vicarious liability5 by which an employer
1. An immunity "avoids liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits
of the immunity itself; it is conferred . . . because of the status or position of the favored
defendant; and it does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability." IV. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971). Charitable immunity has been justified on several theories, including: Trust Fund, the rationale of which is that funds of a charity constitute a trust that
would be violated by payments of tort claims, and Implied Waiver, which adheres to the
principle that a beneficiary of charity impliedly waives his right to sue in return for such
largesse. Id. at 993-94. Governmental immunity appears to have developed from the common
law theory that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at 970. In Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Mr. Justice Holmes explained the rule thusly: "A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends."
2. The "devastating opinion" of Judge Rutledge in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), wherein he reviewed and demolished
all the arguments advanced to support charitable immunity, caused "a tide of rejection [to]
set in; and the great majority of courts have now rejected the immunity completely." XV.
PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1114 (5th ed. 1971). Governmental immunity has suffered similar abrogation. Id. at 1122-24. Accord, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (municipality held liable for negligent performance of
governmental function); Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 313, §1, at 805, to be codified as FLA. STAT.
§768.152 (effective Jan. 1, 1975) (waiver of state sovereign immunity for torts of employees).
3. See, e.g., Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 484 (Mo. 1972); Bing v. Thunig, 2
N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
4. It has been suggested that "the hospital field is not unique." Rather, it "is merely
a small segment of a much larger phenomenon . . . 'an age of expanding liability' . . .
[which] is indicative of a shifting societal concern - an increasing sympathy for the victims of accidents." Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21 HASTNGS L.J.
21, 22 (1969).
5. Vicarious liability means that by virtue of some relation existing between A and B, the
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can be held liable for the tort of an employee committed within the scope
of the employment relationship. 6 At common law, "employment" required
selection and engagement of the tortfeasor, payment of wages, power of dismissal, and power of control over conduct.7 Thus, one seeking to impose
liability on a hospital for the negligence of a doctor under this theory faced
the threshold problem of establishing these four elements.
Initially, such efforts were rebuffed by the courts. When a hospital merely
provided facilities within which a physician practiced his art, the doctrine
was held to be patently inapplicable.8 Even when hospitals hired physicians
on a salaried basis, courts refused to impute liability. It was believed that
the high skill and specialized knowledge of doctors placed them beyond the
control of hospital administrators. 9 Rather, physicians were categorized as
independent contractors, and their negligence was not imputed to the
hospital.10
Respondeat Superior -

Modern

The first imoad into the independent contractor" doctrine was based on
recognition of a distinction between a salaried physician's administrative
and professional capacities." While still refusing to impose liability -on a
hospital for a salaried doctor's negligent medical treatment, courts began to
impute his negligence to the hospital when it occurred in the course of a
2
nonmedical, "ministerial" function.'
This "judicial compromise between the doctrines of respondent superior
and total immunity"' 3 was initially well received. 14 Eventually, however,
negligence of A is to be attributed to B, although B has played no part in it. W. PROSSEa
& J. WADE, supra note 2,at 553.
6. F. MECHEM, OUTLrNES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 237 (4th ed. 1952).
7. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Treadway's Adm'rx, 120 Va. 735, 744-45, 93 S.E. 560,
562 (1917). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460.
8. See, e.g., Barfield v. South Highland Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915); Black
v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923).
9. E.g., Runyan & Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921); Huber v. Protestant
Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956).
10. E.g., Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921); Rosane v. Senger, 112
Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
11. Apparently this distinction was inferred from Justice Cardozo's dicta in Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 132, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914). He said: "If there
are duties performed by nurses foreign to their duties in carrying out the physician's
orders and having relation to the administrative conduct of the hospital, the fact is not
established by this record, nor was it in the discharge of such duties that the defendant
nurses were then serving."
12. In Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), Judge Fuld
said: "Following Schloendorff . . . a body of law has developed making the liability of a

hospital for injuries suffered by a patient, through the negligence of its employees, depend
on whether the injury-producing act was 'administrative' or 'medical.' " Accord, Beeck v.
Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 167, 500 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1972); Fowler v. Norways
Sanatorium, 112 Ind. App. 347, 42 N.E.2d 415 (1942).
13. Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hospitals in New York, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 438 (1952).
14. See note 12 supra.
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courts became disenchanted with the distinction. In Bing v. Thunig15 the
court pointed out the difficulty of differentiating ministerial and medical acts
and concluded that the primary result of adherence to the rule was confusion. 16 Moreover, the court found it anomalous to label doctors and nurses
independent contractors when personnel performing very technical and complicated tasks in other fields are considered employees.' 7 Additionally, the
court pointed out the logical inconsistency of the independent contractor
doctrine as applied to medical practitioners. While a doctor was treated as
an independent contractor if he injured someone else by a "medical" act, he
was considered an employee of the hospital, entitled to compensation, if he
injured himself by the very same act.' Bing therefore jettisoned the notion
that lack of control over the manner in which a salaried physician performs
his medical treatment precludes imputation of such negligence to the hospital.' 9 Instead, the court stated that a salaried physician's negligent act committed within the scope of employment was sufficient to impute negligence to
20

the hospital.

Hospital immunity from vicarious liability for the acts of nonsalaried
physicians has also been eroded. In Guisti v. C.H. Western Co. 2 1 the Oregon
supreme court held that an institution that had entered into a contract to
provide "medical, surgical, and hospital services" 22 was liable for the negligence of a nonsalaried physician who performed the contract. The court said
that "one bound to performance of a duty by contract cannot absolve himself
from such obligation by devolution of performance thereof upon a stranger
to it."" Similarly, in Seneris v. Haas24 the Supreme Court of California held

15. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
16. Id. at 661, 143 N.E.2d at 5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 6. Compare Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Medical School & Hosp., 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E.2d 450 (1946) (placing an improperly
capped hot water bottle on a patient's body held administrative), with Sutherland v. New
York Polyclinic Medical School and Hosp., 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d 583 (1948) (permitting
a hot water bottle to remain on a patient's body too long held medical). Compare Necolayff
v. Genesee Hosp., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947) (blood transfusion given to the wrong
patient held administrative), with Berg v. New York Soc'y for Relief of Ruptured & Crippled,
1 N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1956) (transfusion of the wrong blood
to the right patient held medical).
17. 2 N.Y.2d at 662, 143 N.E.2d at 6, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. The court cited airplane
pilots, locomotive engineers, and chemists as examples of skilled employees whose negligence
has been imputed to their employers.
18. Id. at 664, 143 N.E.2d at 7, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 9. The court cited Becker v. City of
New York, 2 N.Y.2d 226, 235, 140 N.E.2d 262, 267, 159 N.Y.S.2d 174, 183 (1957) and
Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 236 N.Y. 268, 140 N.E. 694 (1923), in support of this statement.
19. Morwin v. Albany Hosp., 7 App. Div. 2d 582, 584, 185 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87-88 (3d
Dep't 1959) says of the Bing holding: "[W]e may now hold a hospital for the negligent acts
of its employees whether medical or administrative and . . . the theory of the independent
contractor as applied to a [salaried] staff doctor is wrong. It [Bing] says no more, no less."
20. 2 N.Y.2d at 666-67, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
21. 165 Ore. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941).
22. Id. at 531, 108 P.2d at 1013.
23. Id.
24. 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
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that vicarious liability could be imposed on a hospital for the negligence of
a nonsalaried anaesthesiologist whom the patient had been led to believe
was an agent of the institution. Thus, the court found the mere appearance
of an agency relationship sufficient to invoke the doctrine of respondeat
superior.25 Because the rationales of both Guisti and Seneris departed from
the traditional requirements of respondeat superior, their substantial acceptance 26 indicates judicial receptiveness to expanded hospital liability.
Corporate Negligence -

Traditional

Corporate negligence, as applied to hospitals, is the "neglect of the officers
or managing directors who [constitute] the governing board of the corporation, as distinguished from the-negligence of its ordinary employees, such as
its superintendent, supervisors, physicians and nurses."27 This doctrine is
predicated on the theory that the hospital, as an entity, owes certain direct,
nondelegable duties to- its patients. 28 The negligent discharge of these duties
results in direct institutional liability, and defenses such as independent contractor are unavailable.
A hospital's responsibility in this context has traditionally been. limited to
administrative functions. As a supplier of facilities, the hospital has a direct
duty to furnish equipment that is neither defective, improper, not inadequate.2 9 Therefore, an injury caused by defective equipment, as distinguished from negligent use of the equipment, results in direct hospital
liability.39 Moreover, while refusing to impose a duty to treat, courts have
nevertheless required hospitals to exercise reasonable care in the selection of
those medical personnel who perform such duties.3 1 Thus, even the early cases
recognized that a hospital could be held liable for medical injuries caused

25., The court said that in order to establish this "ostensible" agency three elements
must be established: "(First) The person dealing with the agent must do so with belief
in the agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; (second) such belief must
be generated by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be charged; (third) and the
third person in relying on the agent's apparent authority must not be guilty of negligence."
Id. at 831, 291 P.2d at 927.
26. E.g., Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957);
Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972); Kober v. Stewart, 417 P.2d
476 (Mont. 1966); Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963);
Jenkins v. Charleston -Gen. .Hosp. 8: Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922).
See Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLvv.-MAR. L. REV. 146, 155 (1968).
27. Edwards v. Grace Hosp. Soc'y, 130 Conn. 568, 571-72, 36 A.2d 273, 274 (1944). Corporate negligence results where the board "fail[s] . . . to follow, in a given situation, the established standard of conduct to which the corporation should conform." Bader v. United
Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 453, 172 A.2d 192, 194 (1961).
28. Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 453, 172 A.2d 192, 194 (1961);
Tocchetti v. Cyril & Julin C. Johnson Memorial Hosp., 130 Conn. 623, 628, 86 A.2d 381,
383 (1944); Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 4, at 11; Southwick, supra note 26, at 152.
29. Southwick, supra note 26, at 153.
30. E.g., South Highlands Infirmary v. Camp, 279 Ala. 1, 180 So. 2d 904 (1965); Sullivan
v. Sisters -of St. Francis, 374 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
31. Southwick, supra note 26, at 154.
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by unlicensed or otherwise unfit personnel whose backgrounds it had failed
to investigate.32
Attempts to expand the corporate duties of hospitals encountered obstacles closely analogous to those that impeded the extended application of
respondeat superior to the physician-institution relationship. Hospitals were
held immune from vicarious liability for the torts of salaried doctors because
they could not control the treatment. Similarly, a hospital was not held to
any direct medical duty because it was a corporation, not a licensed physician,
and thus could not "practice medicine." 33 Cases holding hospitals liable for
negligent selection of medical personnel 34 were distinguished as imposing an
3
administrative rather than a medical duty. 5
Corporate Negligence - Modern
The theory that a corporation could not practice medicine developed in
an era when hospitals were little more than hotels with bedpans. With the
increasing institutionalization of medicine,36 however, hospitals have begun
to employ large numbers of salaried physicians. The addition of these
practitioners to the hospital organization has led commentators to conclude
that the concept of a hospital as a "corporation" should be expanded to include both its administrative and medical staffs. 37 Judicial decisions have also
begun to reflect an awareness of the institution's changed status. In Mitchell
8
County Hospital Authority v. Joiner3
the court said: "[T]he delegation of
the authority to screen applicants for staff membership on the medical staff
does not relieve the [hospital] Authority of its responsibility, since the mem39
bers of the staff act as agents for the Authority."
Because the physicians employed by a hospital are directly engaged in
patient treatment, enlarging the concept of the "corporation" to embrace its
medical staff renders invalid the premise that an institution cannot practice
medicine and provides a sound basis for imposing medical liability on a
hospital.

32. E.g., Hipp v. Hospital Authority, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961); Black v.
Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923); Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628, 634,
14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941).
33. E.g., Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Iterman v. Baker, 214
Ind. 308, 15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
34. E.g., Hipp v. Hospital Authority, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273 (1961); Black
v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923); cf. Smith v. Duke Univ., 219 N.C. 628,
14 S.E.2d 643 (1941).
35. See Southiwick, supra note 26, at 154.
36. Id. at 161.
37. Id.; Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 4, at 13; Comment, Hospital Liability - A New
Duty of Care, 19 MAINE L. Ruv. 102, 107 (1967).

38. 229 Ga.
39. Id. at
P.2d 335, 340-41
211 N.E.2d 253

140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
, 189 S.E.2d at 414. See also Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 80-81, 500
(1972); Darling . Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,
(1965); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605, 608 (Nev. 1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 6

1974

HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF PHYSICIANS

Once it is recognized that a hospital can be held to an independent
medical duty, it becomes necessary to define the extent of this obligation.
Traditionally, a hospital has been required to exercise "that degree of care,
skill, and diligence used by hospitals generally in the community." 40 But
hospitals typically do not attempt to oversee the treatment rendered by a
physician or to reevaluate his competence. Therefore, predicating institutional
responsibility on the "community practice" test results in a mere illusion
of responsibility.
Where a nonsalaried physician has a history of incompetence, a basis for
liability has developed as a result of hospitals' own initiatives toward improving the quality of medical care. Acknowledging that "the public welfare
is paramount,"' 41 hospitals, as well as public and private agencies, have
promulgated bylaws, rules, and standards governing the allocation of staff
privileges.4 2 Because the courts have uniformly upheld denials 4 3 limitations, 44
and suspensions 45 of physician staff privileges stemming from enforcement
of these requirements, hospitals have been placed in the anomalous position
of having the authority to limit a doctor's privileges without being liable for
negligently failing to do so. Recognizing the logical inconsistency of such
a situation, the Supreme Court of Georgia4 6 recently held that a hospital
could be found negligent for permitting a nonsalaried doctor to use its
facilities when it should have known of his incompetence. 47 The court found
the physician's valid Georgia license and the hospital's investigation of his

qualifications prior to his acceptance 48 insufficient to establish conclusively
that the institution had met its duty of acting in good faith and with reason49
able care in allocating staff privileges.
The application of hospital initiative as a measure of institutional liability
is illustrated by Purcell v. Zimbelman.50 After pointing out the pervasiveness
of physician review committees in hospitals,5 ' plaintiff introduced expert

Sprick v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 2d 682, 684 (3d D.C.A. F a. 1960).
Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 344, 17 So. 2d 517, 519 (1944).
E.g., 3 FLA. ADMIN. CODE chs. 10d-28.10, 12a-4.14 (1972); JOINT COMM'N ON AcCRxTATION OF HOSPITALS, STANDARDS FOR AccREDIrrATiON OF HosPrrALs (1969). Staff privileges
contemplate extending permission to use hospital facilities to nonsalaried doctors for such
purposes as performing operations, maternity treatment, or general medical treatment.
43. E.g., Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); Richardson v. City of
Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940).
44. E.g., Green v. City of St. Petersburg, 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944).
45. E.g., Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106 (1947).
46. Mitchell County Hosp. Authority v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972).
47. Id. at
, 189 S.E.2d at 414.
48. Although not stated in the majority opinion, the facts that the allegedly negligent
doctor held a valid Georgia license and that the hospital had investigated him prior to
, 189 S.E.2d at 415-16. These
granting staff privileges was confirmed in the dissent. Id. at
facts were also brought out in the lower court's decision, Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp.
Authority, 125 Ga. App. 1, 3, 186 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1971).
, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1972).
49. 229 Ga. 140,
50. 18 Ariz. App. 75; 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
51. Id. at 81, 500 P.2d at 341. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
40.
41.
42.
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testimony that customary practice actually was to restrict or suspend staff
privileges when a doctor has demonstrated incompetence in a given area.5 2
Finding sufficient evidence that the institution should have known of the
physician's professional shortcomings, the Purcell court held the hospital liable
for breach of its duty to supervise its staff. 53
Although these cases may appear merely to raise the standard of the
hospital's administrative duty to use reasonable care in the selection of medical
personnel, they actually do inject an element of medical responsibility. First,
they require the institution to evaluate the professional competence of the
physician; mere verification of the fact that he has met the standards of others
is insufficient. Second, because a hospital must limit a doctor's privileges if
he shows any incompetence subsequent to his acceptance, the duty of staff
5
evaluation is an ongoing obligation. 4
Even if a nonsalaried physician does not have a history of incompetence,
there is authority for the imposition of hospital liability. In Darlingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,5 plaintiff, who had been treated in the
defendant hospital by a nonsalaried 56 physician, sought to impose liability
directly57 on the hospital for permitting his leg to become gangrenous.
Plaintiff contended that licensing regulations, accreditation standards, and
the defendant's own bylaws defined the duty owed him. 58 The defendant
asserted that the measure of its duty was the degree of care, skill, and diligence
used by hospitals generally in the community.59 The court, however, found
the focus of their dispute misplaced. The question was not one of duty, because "in negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk."'6 0 Rather,
the question was evidentialy. Stating that standards and bylaws, as well as
customary community practice, were admissible as evidence of duty because

52. 18 Ariz. App. at 81, 500 P.2d at 341.
53. Id.
54. The desirability of a continuing evaluative duty is enhanced by the fact that
physician licensure does not provide ongoing assurance of competence.
55. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
56. Despite the indication in Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App.
2d 461, 466, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1968), that the physician in Darling was an employee of
the hospital, all the evidence points to the fact that he was not on salary. Comment, Unnecessary Surgery: Doctor and Hospital Liability, 61 GEO. L.J. 807, 820 & nn.86-87 (1973). In
any event, because the plaintiff settled with the physician the doctor's negligence was never
established, so the case cannot be read to impose vicarious liability for his acts. See
Southwick, supra note 26, at 261. Furthermore, both grounds that the supreme court found
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict - failing to provide enough nurses and neglecting
to require consultation over treatment - ignored the conduct of the attending personnel
and focused on the hospital's direct, corporate duty to provide adequate care for its patients.
See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
57. 33 11. 2d at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
58. Id. at 329-30, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
59. Id. at 330, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
60. Id. at 331, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (emphasis added), quoting W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS
§331 (3d ed. 1964).
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both "aided the jury in deciding what was feasible and what the defendant
knew or should have known,""' the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of
the plaintiff.
By relegating customary community practice to mere evidence of a hospital's duty, while leaving definition of the standard of care to the jury,
Darling changed the method of establishing a hospital's direct duty to its
patients and permitted an expansion of the scope of that duty.6 2 Consequently,
pursuant to written standards, a hospital can be required to monitor the care
being rendered by a nonsalaried physician and to act when it becomes apparent that treatment is below the warranted standard. 63 This concept has
received substantial scholarly acclaim64 and is gaining a growing acceptance
among courts,6 5
The presence and enforcement of rules, standards, and bylaws also provides a legal argument for their admissibility as evidence of a hospital's duty.66
By showing the existence of written procedures and the practice of granting,
limiting, and denying a physician's staff privileges, a plaintiff can allege that
he was led to believe these regulations and selection guidelines were the
standards to which the hospital actually adhered. His entrance into the
hospital would constitute reliance upon such representation and- thus, estop
the hospital from denying that these criteria were the measure of its corporate
duty.67
Moreover, even if no legal duty of adherence to written guidelines is im-

61. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
62. Comment, supra note 37, at 104-05.
63. Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 4, at 13.
64. E.g., Id.; Comment, supra note 56, at 814; Comment, supra note 37, at 109-10.
65. Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446 (D.S.C. 1968) (violation of a rule as to
consultation held negligence); Kapuchinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966)
(violation of a rule concerning handling of premature infants held negligence); Purcell v.
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 :P.2d 335 (1972) (failure -to supervise competence of
staff doctors held negligence); Mitchell County Hosp.. Authority v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140,
189 S.E.2d 412 (1972) (hospital held to duty of reasonable care in-allocating staff privileges);
Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972) (allegation of failure to use proper diagnostic
techniques held sufficient to raise a question of fact as to liability in light of the fact
that hospitals operate under rules and regulations and subject themselves to recognized
accreditation standards); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial -Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 NW.2d
881 (1970) (violation of standard or regulation held evidence of negligence). See also
Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971) (hospital has- duty to provide competent medical service); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1972) (hospital
has duty to review and evaluate quality of medical care rendered); Fiorentino v. Wenger,
19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967) (hospital owes its patients a duty
to prohibit false medical treatment); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 73, 431 P.2d 973
(1967) (breach of hospital rule indicative of negligence).
66. This argument would be of benefit to an injured plaintiff in a situation where
the court, unlike the Darling court, was unwilling to permit the admission of rules and
standards into evidence without a legal justification for admission.
67. Cf. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (doctor held "ostensible"
agent of hospital). Proof that the reliance was detrimental should be no more difficult than
in the "ostensible" agency situation, where the fact of an injury is apparently sufficient.
See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
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posed, a hospital's initiative could provide a basis for invoking the Good
Samaritan rule, which requires one to use reasonable care in the execution of
a task whether or not he was under a legal duty to undertake its performance. 6s
The hospital's promulgation of bylaws and allocation of staff privileges based
on these standards should be considered a sufficient "undertaking 69 to invoke
the rule. Thus, the hospital would be held liable in situations where it could
have prevented an injury by using due care in the implementation of its
procedures.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that there exists a judicial
movement toward holding hospitals to an independent medical duty. It also
indicates that the standard of care will be defined by legislative regulations,
expert guidelines, and self-imposed hospital rules as well as by customary community practice. 0
HOSPITAL LIABILITY IN FLORIDA

The Florida supreme court clearly embraced the doctrine of respondeat
superior in Parrish v. Clark,71 which held a hospital liable for the negligence
of a salaried nurse. In rejecting defendant's contention that the extent of its
duty was to use due care in the selection of attendants, the court said the
hospital would be liable "regardless of the competency of the nurse" 2 because her negligence occurred during the performance of "a duty which she

68. Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 90-1, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
69. For examples of the "minor acts," which have been held a sufficient "undertaking."
see W. PROSSER & J. WADE, supra note 2, at 414.
70. As reported 5 PROFFSSIONAL LIABILITY Ni',StstrHIn, Dec. 1973, at 1-3, a recent California superior court decision, Gonzales v. Nork, indicates that even written standards may
not provide a sufficiently stringent measure of a hospital's corporate dut) to its patients
for the acts of nonsalaried staff physicians. After a contraindicated laminectomy performed
by Dr. Nork in co-defendant Mercy General Hospital, plaintiff suffered back pain attributed
to arachnoiditis. He also suffered adverse psychological effects leading to alcoholism and
suicidal tendencies. The physical symptoms are similar to those suffered by many of the
thirty-five other patients whose lawsuits against Dr. Nork are pending or haxe been resolved. In reference to the institution's corporate responsibility Judge Goldberg said: "The
hospital by xirtue of its custody of the patient, owes him a duty of care; this duty includes
the obligation to protect him from acts of malpractice by his independently retained physician
who is a member of the hospital staff if the hospital knows, or has reason to know, or
should have known, that such acts are likely to occur." The judge found the hospital
corporately negligent for failing to discover Dr. Nork's propensity to injure patients, notwithstanding the fact that the institution's medical review committees functioned according
to the standards established by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).
Noting the testimony by the deputy director of the JCAH that its rexiew procedures were
random and might fail to identify substandard conduct, Judge Goldberg said that such
rules are "means whereby the hospital meets its corporate responsibility; they are not
means whereby it insulates itself from liability." Thus, the judge found that the exigencies
of the situation required a standard of care even higher than that imposed by JCAH regulations, and that adherence to the written standard was neither sufficient vigilance nor
a defense to hospital liability.
71. 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933).
72. Id. at 602, 145 So. at 850.
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was performing for her principal, the hospital proprietor, who employed her
for that purpose." 73 This holding was later extended to the administrative74
75
and medical acts of interns.
The supreme court has also indicated that a hospital could be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician. In Wilson v. Lee Memorial
Hospital7 the court found plaintiff's allegation that doctors were agents of
the hospital sufficient to warrant reversal of a summary judgment for the
defendant because "if the ... surgeons were agents of the hospital, under the
doctrine of respondeat superior it was error to dismiss [the hospital] as a
77
party."
Apparently, the expanded concept of corporate negligence has not as yet
found its way into Florida hospital law.78 Nevertheless, a plaintiff seeking to
invoke the doctrine can point to supreme court decisions indicating a trend
toward corporate liability. In Richardson v. City of Miami 79 the court
recognized a hospital's right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations concerning the qualifications of nonsalaried physicians permitted to use its
facilities.8 0 Green v. City of St. Petersburgs ' expanded the hospital's regulatory power by holding that reasonable rules concerning practice within the
hospital, such as those restricting staff privileges, could be imposed if the
83
2
best interests of the community so required. Bryant v. City of Lakeland
completed hospital control over the quality of staff medical care by holding

73. Id.
74. City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942).
75. In Parmerter v. Osteopathic Gen. Hosp., 196 So. 2d 505 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967),
the district court held the hospital vicariously liable for negligent gynecological treatment
on the part of an intern whose conduct was in the performance of ordinary duties - assisting a doctor whom the jury found to be the hospital's agent. Id. at 507.
76. 65 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1953).
77. Id. at 42. Accord, City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
78. In an extremely ambiguous opinion, Snead v. Lejeune Road Hosp., Inc., 196
So. 2d 179 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967), the court upheld a summary judgment for the defendant
on a "complaint . . . premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, and alleged

negligence in the hospital permitting the physician to perform operations on its premises."
The court stated: "We have reexamined these [Florida] authorities and others cited by the
appellant and, on the state of the record and briefs before us, fail to find error in the
entry of the instant summary final judgment." Id. In support of its finding the court cited,
inter alia, Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S.E. 103 (1923), which held that the extent
of a hospital's duty is to use reasonable care in the selection of physicians. Thus, Snead
might be read to uphold the traditional hospital duty with respect to physicians. On the
other hand, the opinion does not indicate whether appellant alleged that the hospital
should have known of the doctor's incompetence, or that it broke a rule. The court may
not even have addressed the expanded corporate negligence question. Finally, the court's
statement that the briefs and record showed no error might only mean that the cited
authorities had not embraced the expanded corporate negligence concept, with the court
expressing no opinion as to the acceptability of the theory.
79. 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940).
80. Id. at 303, 198 So. at 55.
81. 154 Fla. 339, 17 So. 2d 517 (1944).
82. Id. at 343-44, 17 So. 2d at 519.
83. 158 Fla. 151. 28 So. 2d 106 (1946).
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that the institution could take disciplinary action, including suspension of
privileges, for breach of its rules.84 Subsequently, North Broward Hospital
District v. Mizell-5 greatly expanded hospital discretion in exercising control
over its medical staff. The court held that a statute permitting "the Board of
Commissioners . . . to give, grant, or revoke licenses and privileges of staff
members ... so that the welfare and health of patients and the best interests

of the hospital may at all times be best served,"86 provided an adequate
standard for measuring the propriety of exclusions or suspensions of physicians
8
from hospital staffs.

7

These cases demonstrate that Florida hospitals have control over the
quality of the medical care they provide and evidence a tendency toward
expansion of the power. The logical extension of a power to control is legal
responsibility for its negligent misuse. It is on this reasoning that a hospital
in Florida could be held to a duty to adhere to self-imposed standards. 88
Florida decisions outside the hospital sphere provide further support
for the argument that a hospital should be liable for failure to adhere to its
bylaws when such adherence would have prevented injury to a patient. In
Shealorv. Ruud 89 the court held that a city could be found liable for the negligent operation of a warning system at a railroad crossing, notwithstanding the
fact that "there was no duty requiring the defendant-city to plan, undertake,
and provide the signal device." 90 The court stated that "one who assumes to act
may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully if he acts at all."91
Anologously, even if the hospital is found to be under no duty to promulgate
rules of medical practice or to withhold staff privileges from unqualified physicians, it should be liable for the negligent implementation of such procedures.

84. Id. at 158, 28 So. 2d at 109.
85. 148 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1962).
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 4.
88. The cases of Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) (hospital held liable
for negligence of its nurse); City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942)
(hospital held liable for negligence of its intern); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d
40 (Fla. 1953) (hospital can be held liable for negligence of agent-doctor) evince a second
trend indicating that the Florida supreme court would be receptive to an expanded corporate
negligence concept. These cases show a chronological expansion of a hospital's vicarious
liability to include nurses, interns, and doctors. As indicated in Oates, in which the court
distinguished a series of cases holding railroad companies immune from vicarious liability
for negligence of physicians employed to treat employees and passengers because "th[ose]
physicians were in nowise under the supervision and control of the employer," 152 Fla. 21,
28, 10 So. 2d 721, 724 (1942), the essential requirement for the expansion of vicarious
liability has been an element of control on the part of the purported principal. Similarly,
a finding of control over the quality of medical care should dictate imposition of corporate
liability for negligent use of this power.
89. 221 So. 2d 765 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
90. Id. at 768.
91. Id. at 769.
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EVALUATION

The expanded scope of hospital liability is a legal reflection of the dramatic transformation in the role of the hospital as an institution. 92 The common denominator found in recent hospital liability cases is an attempt to
make the hospital's legal duty commensurate with its responsibilities in the
modern health care system. Therefore, evaluation of concepts of hospital
liability must focus primarily on the extent to which the liability imposed
reflects the duty undertaken. 3 The desired effect of this expanded responsibility is the achievement of the primary purpose of a hospital - quality medical
care.94
Salaried Physicians
Because a person entering a hospital usually believes he is placing himself
in the care of the institution, as well as the attending physicians, 5 he logically
concludes that salaried doctors are agents of the hospital performing the institution's duty of dispensing medical treatment. Therefore, commensurate with
the duty undertaken, imposition of vicarious liability is appropriate. Furthermore, if a hospital knows it will be held liable for the negligence of its
doctors it will carefully select physicians and limit their practice to areas in
which they are competent. The promulgation of, and adherence to, rules
and regulations requiring evaluation, consultation, and other practices aimed
at preventing malpractice will also be encouraged. For these reasons, the
doctrine of respondeat superior should be applied to doctors and their institutional employers.
Nonsalaried Staff Physicians Engaged by the Patient
Patients entering hospitals pursuant to the directions of a personal
physician probably believe that the doctor will be responsible for the treatment. Because the hospital has not undertaken the duty to provide medical
treatment, vicarious liability for the physician's malpractice imposes an ob-

92. See Linden, Changing Patterns of Hospital Liability in Canada, 5 ALBERTA L. REV.
212, 224-25 (1966); Comment, supra note 37, at 109.
93. In determining the duty undertaken, the patient's interpretation and viewpoint
should control because "the public welfare is paramount," Green v. City of St. Petersburg,
154 Fla. 339, 344, 17 So. 2d 517, 519 (1944), and because of "shifting societal concern - an
increasing sympathy for the victims of accidents . . . cause[ld] by mass operations." Hanson
& Stromberg, supra note 4, at 22.
94. It has been suggested that the primary goal of hospitals' legal obligations should
be patient compensation and protection. See Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 4. Logically
extended, this theory results in absolute hospital liability without regard to negligence.
While the argument is 2i tenable one, its intricacies are beyond the scope of this commentary, which is concerned solely with assessing liability based on fault.
95. Beeck v. Tucson General Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 169, 500 P.2d 1153, 1157 (1972);
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
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ligation disproportionate to the responsibility assumed.96 Thus, the doctrine
of respondeatsuperioris inappropriate in this context. By virtue of its custody
over the patient, however, the institution has a duty to provide care. The
care a hospital provides includes protection from foreseeable risks.9 7 Because
malpractice by the treating physician can constitute such a danger, the institution should be held independently liable where reasonable vigilance on its
part could have prevented the injury. 9 The imposition of independent liability is particularly appropriate where the neglect involves breach of rules
promulgated by the hospital for the protection of a patient. 99 Holding the
hospital to an independent duty to protect its patients should have positive
effects on the quality of medical care similar to those fostered by vicarious
liability. 00 Therefore, the doctrine of corporate negligence should be employed
to impose liability on a hospital for the negligent act of an affiliated, nonsalaried physician.
Nonsalaried Stafi Physicians Supplied by the Hospital
Because quality medical care is promoted by both respondeat superior and
corporate negligence, the extent of the liability imposed in this context depends solely on the duty undertaken. A patient assigned a doctor on entering
a hospital is normally unaware of the physician-institution relationship. Where
no reference is made to the doctor's status, the patient is justified in assuming
that the institution has undertaken the duty to treat him through its agent.
If, on the other hand, the hospital makes it clear to the patient that the
physician is not an employee and that it is merely acting as a referral service
for the doctor, an agency assumption is unreasonable. Therefore, the doctrine
of respondeat superior should be employed only if the true physician-institution relationship is not clarified, 10' while corporate negligence should be applied where the patient is properly advised of the doctor's true status.
CONCLUSION

Rejection of the principles of hospital immunity from suit has thrust the
field of hospital liability into a prominent position in tort law. Enlargement

96. Most hospitals now employ large numbers of physicians. Accordingly, a patient
usually has the choice of employing his own private physician or availing himself of a
salaried hospital doctor. Imposition of vicarious liability for the malpractice of a patient's
private physician seems particularly unfair where the patient thus implicitly rejects the
hospital doctor's services.
97. Sprick v. North Shore Hosp., Inc., 121 So. 2d 682 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).

98. See cases cited notes 65, 70 supra.
99. Id.
100. See text following note 95 supra.
101. This liability emanates from the "ostensible" agency theory. See note 25 supra.
If failure to clarify the physician-institution relation is considered to be "some act or neglect
by the principal," then the elements are unchanged; if it is not, then the burden has been
shifted from proving to disproving "ostensibility."
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of the institution's responsibility for the negligence of doctors stems from a
desire to bring the legal duties of hospitals into line with their modern medical
responsibilities. Imposition of vicarious liability for salaried physicians is
particularly appropriate in light of the substantial benefits hospitals derive
from such employees. 0 2 Measuring a hospital's independent duty for nonsalaried doctors by regulations and standards defines institutional liability for
physician negligence in accordance with legislative and expert opinion, 0 3
rather than the amorphous guideline of "community practice." Additionally,
both respondeat superior and corporate negligence will encourage better
medical practice in the form of increased staff consultation over questionable
treatment and stricter adherence to procedures designed for patient protection. Finally, a patient's chances of finding a financially responsible defendant
will be enhanced.
Societal concern has shifted toward patient protection and sympathy for
victims of accidents.' 0° Because hospitals are the most effective institutions
for achieving this goal, 0 5 expansion of hospital liability is both necessary
and desirable.
RicHARD CANDELOPLA

102. Comment, Agency: Liability of a Hospital for the Negligent Acts of a PhysicianEmployee, 18 OKA. L. REV. 77 (1965).
103. For examples of legislative and expert opinion in this area, see authorities cited note
42 supra.
104. Hanson & Stromberg, supra note 4, at 21-22.
105. Comment, supra note 56, at 814,
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